structural problems that prevent this component from growing economically to the same degree as the rest of the federation. Some scholars argue that asymmetry should be dependent on the institutional capacity of the relevant unit to exercise its self-government powers efficiently. The more a given subnational unit provides the population with efficient services, the more the federation should grant either more powers or additional fiscal transfers (Antonini 2000) .
At first, asymmetry in immigration policy is difficult to conceive. Immigration, and even more so, the selection of immigrants, are regarded as a national responsibility and as a consequence, uniformity is the rule. There are several explanations for this: immigration encroaches upon the foreign affairs of the state, it concerns the control of national borders, and finally it impinges upon the personal component of the state, which the national level has an interest in shaping.
However, there may be reasons that justify a certain degree of devolution in the selection procedure and thus de facto asymmetry.
I For instance, sub-national units may be considered best placed to evaluate their labour force needs. There are also grounds for justifying de jure asymmetry. In a multinational state, a subnational unit in which a national/language minority is principally settled -thus constituting a majority with respect to the regional territory -may feel the need to preserve its cultural homogeneity with respect to immigrants. This occurs especially when immigrants find it more useful or more E -60 attractive to learn the language of the national majority than to learn the local language (Kymlicka 2001 , Zapata-Barrero 2009 . Due to such a situation, subnational units may be granted special powers enabling them to select immigrants on the basis of their capacity to integrate successfully in the cultural/linguistic environment of the relevant unit.
The case of Canada is particularly interesting for examining the issue of 'immigration federalism', II and within it, the different dynamics of de facto and de jure asymmetry.
Unlike many other constitutions, the Canadian Constitution Act 1867 conceives immigration as a concurrent jurisdiction, although the supremacy of federal law is expressly foreseen. The first section of this paper will explore the reasons that led the Canadian constituent assembly to introduce this provision and the early practice and case law that, since the beginning of the 20 th century, have oriented the system towards centralization.
The second section will explore subsequent practice in immigration federalism, where, through intergovernmental agreements, the federal government progressively granted Quebec special powers in the selection of immigrants. This asymmetric de jure approach towards devolution in immigration has been followed by a progressive devolution of immigrant selection powers to the other Provinces as well, shifting from de jure to a certain degree of de facto asymmetry. This process has proved to be successful over the years, but recently the federal government has reacted, and recentralized some aspects of immigration policy, notably immigrant settlement services. This does not apply to Quebec, which is the only Province to have exclusive responsibility in this area.
I argue that this policy change may suggest that, although immigration federalism in the selection of immigrants may be grounded on reasons other than the need to accommodate linguistic or ethnic claims, it remains the case that the former are "weaker" than the latter and are more subject to pressure from central government. This is also confirmed by looking at the mechanisms through which intergovernmental agreements have been translated into law, an issue explored in the third section of this paper. Unlike the Quebec case, immigration's devolution in relation to the other Provinces has occurred through administrative delegation of powers from the federal government. This permits the federal government to exercise some form of political pressure in order to realign the Provinces' discretionary choices in the selection of immigrants, in light of federal objectives.
Finally, in the concluding remarks, the paper will consider to what extent the Canadian case may be useful to assess in the light of some EU Member States' experiences of immigration federalism, traditionally more concerned with migrant integration rather than selection.
The origins of immigration federalism in the Constitution Act, 1867 and early practice
The power to admit or deny aliens entry to the national territory (jus excludendi alios) is traditionally considered as a prerogative of sovereignty (Plender 1998: 6) . As a consequence, even in compound territorial states, it is vested in the national tier of government.
However, from an historical perspective, although the power of the king to deny entry or to expel aliens has been admitted since the dawn of the modern age, the lack of a central well-articulated bureaucratic apparatus made this power quite ineffective. The monopolization of the legitimate means of movement by states, and thus the effective control of their national territory and population, has been a very lengthy process that has its roots in the French Revolution when, for the first time, a system of border controls and identification of aliens was implemented (Torpey 2000) .
Before this, jus excludendi alios was a power exercised by local authorities, related to welfare access. Lacking a national system of social assistance, each local authority was responsible for providing the poor with some minimal relief. In order to avoid rendering local authorities responsible for the poor of other territorial communities, they were entitled to remove anyone "likely to be chargeable to the parish" to their place of legal settlement. This applied irrespective of the national origin of the person. This system was in place in England since the adoption of the Elizabethan poor law, III but similar arrangements were known in France and Prussia as well (Brubaker 1992).
These brief historical references can help us to better contextualize the jus excludendi alios power in the context of the federal experience in North America. 
VIII
The reference to the US experience is important in order to historically contextualize those provisions of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1867 that expressly concern the division of powers in the area of immigration. On the one hand, the influence that the US federalism experience and the US Civil War played on the choices of the Canadian founding fathers is well known, pushing them towards a strengthening of the Confederation's powers (Smith 1993: 67; D'Ignazio 2002: 9) . On the other hand, like many American states, Canadian Provinces, relying on their inherent police powers, had already passed statutes regulating immigration, usually forbidding entry to those people that could become a burden upon local welfare, or that had previously been convicted of serious crimes in their countries of origin.
The result of these partially contradictory rationales is sec. 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which conceives of immigration as a concurrent jurisdiction. This is an exception within the Canadian watertight model of division of powers, and it means that both federal and provincial legislators are empowered to act in the immigration field. However, in order to safeguard federal interests, the clause explicitly provides that the law of a Province «shall have effect in and for the province as long and as far only as it is not repugnant to any act of the Parliament of Canada».
Thus, the clause gives the federal Parliament wide discretion in defining the role of the Provinces in immigration, admitting at least three options. Indeed, sec. 95 makes it clear that the federal legislator can opt at any moment for uniformity and centralization, since it E -63 asserts the paramountcy of federal law in the field. However, sec. 95 also seems to admit decentralization in immigration and thus de facto asymmetry. There is also a third option.
Sec. 95 states that federal Parliament may «pass law into all or any of the provinces». This means that the territorial scope of a federal statute in immigration may be formally limited to a part only of the national territory. Thus, de jure asymmetry, at least with regard to the territorial scope of the federal statute in immigration, would be compatible with the clause. E -64 to be in breach of sec. 95 and declared it preempted by the 1869 federal statute (Hucker: 1975, 649ss.) .
Although the classification of immigration as a concurrent jurisdiction could suggest that the conflict between a federal and a provincial statute on immigration should be evaluated in concrete terms, favouring the best interpretation for the safeguarding of both statutes, the court's reasoning in the two cases seemed to suggest a different conclusion. It applied a "covering of the field" test: once the federal legislator had acted in an immigration matter, the provincial legislator was prevented from taking action in the field, except in cases where the provincial statute was in furtherance of the federal statute.
The outbreak of World War I coincided with the adoption of restrictive measures on immigration, increasingly seen as an issue related to national security and foreign affairs, both falling within federal jurisdiction. As a result, immigration federalism in Canada vanished.
Immigration federalism regained political salience with claims for the recognition of Quebec as a distinct society that led to the conclusion of executive agreements granting the Province meaningful power in selecting economic migrants. Since the second half of the 1990s, this devolutionary trend has been extended to the other Provinces as well. This practice was considered by both territorial levels of governments as a way of implementing the original understanding of sec. 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
However, this approach to devolution in immigration was, and still is, subject to the political will of the federal level. Parliament was free, as it still is, to simply ignore these agreements and the Provinces lacked remedies against such a decision. Because of the weak position that the Canadian constitution granted to the devolutionary framework in immigration, at the time of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords Quebec and the other Provinces pushed the federal government to accept some amendments to sec. 95. By and large, these amendments were aimed at constitutionalizing the practice of the intergovernmental agreements and considering them as a mechanism for determining the exact division of powers in immigration (Garcea: 1993; Schwartz: 1987, 132-133) .
Had the Meech Lake Accord been approved, intergovernmental immigration 
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Only in 1978, following the signature of the Cullen-Couture agreement, was Quebec granted substantial powers in the selection procedure. The Canadian immigration selection system was based, as it still is today, on a points system. The applicant had to totalize a given score by meeting several criteria that evaluated a candidate's capacity to adapt to the Canadian labour market.
Under the Coullen-Couture agreement, the selection of permanent economic migrants applying from abroad was the result of a joint decision-making process (see for a detailed account Garcea 1993: 111-129). Applicants had to be assessed under both federal and Quebec standards. However, applicants that met Quebec's standards would be admitted, even if they did not qualify under the federal government's selection criteria. At the same time, applicants who met the federal government's standard but failed to qualify under Quebec's standards would be denied entry into Quebec. In this case, applicants could be selected by the federal administration and once they had entered into Canada, could nevertheless settle in Quebec.
XIII The federal administration retained the power to deny entry to migrants selected by Quebec on the grounds of security, public order, or public health (see Garcea 1993).
Quebec was also granted the power to select asylum seekers who applied from abroad.
The federal tier of government retained the exclusive power to determine whether the applicant qualified as a refugee or as a person in similar circumstances in need of Canada's protection. However, once identified by the federation, the applicant had to meet Quebec's criteria in order to be admitted to Canada (Garcea 1993: 111-129) .
In relation to other categories of immigrants, namely temporary workers, students, and persons seeking medical attention, Quebec was granted a negative veto. This meant that federal government retained the right to reject the applications of such candidates, even if they received approval from Quebec (Garcea 1993: 111-129).
The Cullen-Couture agreement gave Quebec the power to establish its own grid for selecting immigrants. There were two core criteria that permitted an immigrant to acquire the selection certificate: knowledge of French and adaptability. This second criterion gave wide discretion to Quebec's officers in assessing whether the applicant had the ability to rapidly integrate into Quebecker society. In practice, these criteria were applied so as to favour candidates coming from francophone countries, despite otherwise weak applications (Houle: 2014, 216) . Over the years, the need to attract educated, skilled and The failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords had two consequences.
From a legal perspective, the nature of the intergovernmental agreement agreed with Quebec and its conformity with the Constitution Act, 1867 remained unclear. It was evident, nevertheless, that the federal Parliament was by no means bound by it. It could act unilaterally and thus preempt Quebecker legislation, with no need to respect any of the procedural safeguards foreseen in the agreement. However, in political terms, due to the failure to find a constitutional accommodation with Quebec, after the repatriation, and due to the resurgence of popular support for the separatist movement, not only was a revision of the Coullen-Couture agreement impracticable, but Quebec's claims for strengthening its powers in the immigration field were even tougher than before.
government, signed in 1991 and still in force (see Young 1992 , Garcea 1993 .
The agreement recognised Quebec's right to receive the same percentage of the total number of immigrants admitted to Canada as is its percentage of the Canadian population, with the right to exceed it by 5% for demographic reasons. Quebec is solely responsible for the selection of permanent and temporary economic migrants, who must be assessed under Quebec's points system alone. However, the federal administration retains some competency in the admission procedure: immigrants selected by Quebec may be refused entry by federal administrators only on the grounds of national security, public order, and public health. The federal government is also responsible for determining which individuals qualify as a refugee and, once this evaluation is completed, Quebec can select those refugees it feels best suit Quebec's interests. Finally, the federal administration withdrew from the delivery of services for the reception and linguistic integration of permanent residents, instead granting Quebec a federal monetary transfer in order to provide the services. In practical terms, this was the main achievement of the 1991 agreement.
The 1991 agreement's preamble explicitly states that «the integration of immigrants to that Province in a manner that respects the distinct identity of distinct society of Quebec» is one of the aims pursued by the agreement.
This further devolution of powers in immigration is then explicitly related to the need to promote and defend the cultural and linguistic background of Quebec. At the same time, however, the agreement also makes a reference to immigration as a shared jurisdiction under sec. 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867. This suggests that devolution to Quebec of immigration powers is to be considered consistent with an original understanding of Canadian federalism with regard to immigration, implying that it may be applicable to the other subnational units as well.
Thus, the 1991 agreement contains two rationales: on the one hand, it is coherent with a de jure asymmetry perspective and consistent with the need to accommodate Quebec's claim to a distinct society; on the other hand, it may merely be seen as an instrument through which the Federal government effectively implements sec. 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and the idea expressed therein of immigration as a concurrent jurisdiction.
However, this second rationale would have implied that the Federal government guaranteed devolution in immigration to the other Provinces as well, moving from de jure asymmetry to de facto asymmetry.
Moving towards de facto asymmetry
As Moreover, federal policy with regard to the selection of economic migrants progressively favored highly skilled applicants. This transpired to be a problem for those
Provinces that had a need for low skilled jobs.
In the 1980s, some Provinces, such as Manitoba and Alberta, realised the importance of immigration for their regional economies. However, the federal government was quite reluctant to provide wide decentralization in the selection procedure, using Quebec as an example (Garcea: 1993).
The signing of the 1991 agreement with Quebec marked a turning point in this regard.
Given the sensitivity of the other Provinces towards symmetry in federalism, the Federal government was pressured to promote generalized decentralization in immigration matters. 
The current recentralization and the resurgence of de jure asymmetry
Over the years, the federal government has become increasingly worried about the provincial nominee programs, as increasing PNP admission numbers were leading to a drop in the number of immigrants selected under federal administered programs.
Investigations conducted by the federal ministry revealed that in some cases, the PNP These shortcomings, coupled with the will of the federal government to focus its priority action more on key economic issues, led the federal administration to implement stricter control of provincial measures in immigration. PNP programs were maintained, but the federal government pressured the Provinces to realign their PNP to national purposes (Paquet 2014: 540; Banting 2012: 90-91) . The number of immigrants admitted through the PNP were capped at the levels of the previous years. As a consequence, some Provinces, which in the past had agreed for low numbers of immigrants through PNP, were prevented from admitting more (Paquet 2014: 540).
The recentralization process has been most evident in relation to integration services for migrants. As noted, only Quebec, Manitoba and British Columbia had agreed with the federal government to accept full responsibility for providing integration services in return for a federal money transfer. In the other Provinces, integration services have been federally administered or have followed a mixed approach. Thus, currently only Quebec has the power to provide settlement services for immigrants.
Immigration has thus undergone a change in terms of policy. The decision to recentralize settlement services, as well as pressures for the alignment of PNPs to the national purposes in the field of immigration, seem to put the previous move from de jure asymmetry to de facto asymmetry under strain (Paquet 2014; Reeve 2014) . This also confirms the weak legal nature of intergovernmental agreements and their main relevance as a matter of political, rather than legal, commitment, an issue we will now explore.
Immigration federalism, asymmetry and the legal framework
The unilateral withdrawal of the federal government from the agreements concluded with British Colombia and Manitoba with regard to the provision of settlement services in immigration indicates a need to focus our analysis on the legal nature of these agreements. Thus, in light of this framework, the IRPA provisions do not seem to represent a sound basis on which to give force of law to the intergovernmental agreements in immigration.
However, this is not enough to conclude that they have no legal effect, since the normative substance of these agreements may be reflected by official sources of law and thereby become binding and opposable to third parties. 
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Constitution by means of legislative inter-delegation (La Forest 1975: 131) . In a case decided by the Supreme Court, the federation and the Provinces decided on a statutory scheme for old age pensions. Since the federal level had no constitutional power to impose a contributory pension scheme on the Provinces, while the Provinces had no power to levy taxes for financing such a scheme, each parliamentary assembly lent the other, by means of delegation, the necessary powers. In Attorney General of Nova Scotia, XIX the Supreme Court struck down the initiative, holding that one legislative body cannot enlarge the power of another by authorizing it to enact laws where the matter falls outside of its jurisdiction.
The Nova Scotia decision has also had some echoes in the debate concerning the devolution of immigration to Quebec. Some scholars, opposing the constitutionality of the Cullen-Couture agreement, suggested that the federal government had delegated the responsibility in the selection of immigrants to Quebec, despite the fact that, under sec.
91.25 (but not under sec. 95), selection of immigrants falls under the exclusive federal jurisdiction on naturalization and aliens.
Although the Nova Scotia decision is still a binding and quoted precedent, over the years the Supreme Court has validated other techniques that have permitted the development of cooperative federalism, and has allowed for the departure from the Nova Scotia rationale based on dual federalism. Inter-administrative delegation of powers and referential incorporation are among them.
Inter-administrative delegation of powers occurs when, in an area of exclusive federal responsibility, the federal Parliament delegates the power to the federal executive to regulate the matter. The federal executive is, in turn, enabled to delegate this power to the provincial executive branch.
XX
Referential incorporation occurs when a federal statute incorporates, by reference, rules that exist in another jurisdiction, included the provincial one. The Supreme Court has even admitted anticipatory incorporation by reference that occurs when the referred rule is not already in force, but it when it might come into existence in the future. Thus, the signing of the agreement is the condition that allows the Federal government to delegate its administrative powers of selecting economic migrants to provincial administrators.
The fact that the provincial administration acts under a delegation of administrative powers implies some limitations to provincial discretion. For instance, sec. 87.3 of the IRPR sets out the rule that the federal administration may, after consultation with the provincial administration, review the provincial evaluation on the grounds of the likely ability of the foreign national to become economically established in Canada. Moreover, under sec. 10.2.1 of the IRPA, the federal minister retains the power to give instructions and thus to realign PNP to federal objectives. XXIV As noted above, this power has been substantially exercised after the federal administration's review revealed some misalignments of PNP with the federal objectives.
The mechanism to give force of law to the Canada-Quebec agreement follows a different scheme. According to sec. 9 of the IRPA, the signing of the intergovernmental agreement, under which a Province is granted sole responsibility for the selection of foreign nationals, has the primary function of triggering the application of sec. 9.1 paragraphs a), b), c), d), provided that the agreement does not state otherwise. This safety clause is undeniably difficult to assess, as it seems to confer on the intergovernmental agreement a higher position than federal law, and suggests that the agreement, as such, would be opposable to Parliament's discretion.
However, setting aside this reservation, sec. 9 in practice replicates the content of the 1991 agreement in so far as it grants Quebec a negative and a positive veto with regard to the selection of immigrants, and it incorporates, by reference, the law of the Province, granting it the same force and effect as the IRPA provisions. It is not, then, the intergovernmental agreement as such that is incorporated by reference, but a statutory act of the Province.. It follows, then, that unlike the other Provinces, where the power to select immigrants stems from a delegation of administrative powers, Quebec exercises its own legislative functions with regard to immigration. The discretion of the Quebec administration is not subject to any limitations by the federal administration. This cannot substitute the Quebec administrative evaluation, as it may occur under the PNP programs, and the federal Minister is not allowed to give instructions, However, it is important to stress that the evaluation with respect to public order, public security, and health requirements in order to admit an alien remains a federal responsibility. 
Concluding remarks: a lesson to learn -Immigration executive federalism?
The Thus, although Provinces other than Quebec still maintain relevant powers in the selection procedure, the result of these policy changes has denoted a resurgence of de jure asymmetry.
Quebec is the only Province that maintains the full control of migrants' integration process. Unlike the other Provinces, Quebec acts autonomously in the field of selection of immigrants, and not under a delegation of administrative powers. This also implies that while in relation to PNP programs a unilateral decision of the federal government is enough to end them, in the Quebec case an act of Parliament is needed.
Thus, the Canadian case tells us that devolution in selection procedures, and in integration of migrants, may be an answer not only to subnational-units' national claims, but also to the economic and/or demographic needs of territorial units. However, the two grounds may not equally counterbalance the national interest in a uniform policy in migrants' selection and integration. The federal measures adopted in 2012 seem to confirm that immigration federalism is more likely to develop, or, at least, to have a broader scope, in compound territorial states characterized by ethnic and linguistic cleavages, where it is used as an instrument to bring together the different original nations. XXV Because of this, immigration federalism is also inherently asymmetric.
A second element to highlight is the role played by sec. 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867 in shaping the current Canadian immigration federalism scene. I argued that sect. 95
of the Constitution Act, 1867 may be interpreted according to three different options:
centralization, de facto asymmetry and de jure asymmetry. As a matter of fact, the Canadian system has over time developed each of these different possibilities. Because of this, it may be assumed that sect. 95 has not been crucial for a correct understanding of the division of powers in immigration, whose effective boundaries have been defined by interadministrative agreements rather than by the Constitution. However, such a conclusion would be unwarranted: the very existence of the immigration clause has allowed for the consideration of the devolution in immigration, as developed in the inter-administrative agreements, to be legitimate and consistent with the original understanding of the constitutional division of powers rather than beyond the letter of the Constitution.
The failure of the Meech Lake and the Charlottetown Accords has certainly been a missed opportunity, not only to constitutionalize the practice of the intergovernmental agreements and state clearly their ability to derogate the federal primacy under both sec. 95
and 91.25 of the Constitution Act, 1867, but also to guarantee to the representatives of both federal and provincial legislatures the possibility of exercising democratic control over the process of conclusion, modification or redrawing of the intergovernmental agreements.
However, the fact that at both the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords'
conclusions the insertion of a new immigration clause was not a highly debated issue, might confirm that the Canadian system as a whole has accepted that devolution in immigration is indeed an acknowledged feature of the federal-provincial relations. After all, even the recent recentralization trend has had as a consequence a better realignment of PNP programs with federal objectives, rather than the ending of the PNP's existence.
A further point worth highlighting is the legal technique which make the immigration intergovernmental agreements legally binding. As noted in relation to PNPs, this occurs Ct. 2492 Ct. (2012 . IX Arguably, this could also mean that the federal statute might provide different treatment that would apply only in some of the Provinces. This would not be a specificity of immigration, however, but rather is a general tenet of Canadian federalism. In fact, Peter Hogg (2003: 439) suggests that «while uniform laws are usual, federal law occasionally impose different rules on different part of the country. There is no constitutional requirement of uniformity». (which corresponded to 13,089 people), while the percentage of migrants admitted through federal programs was 8.5% (1, 223) . In Ontario, the situation was reversed, with a percentage of migrants selected by the federal programs which amounted to 94.2% (98,733) and only 1.2% selected by the PNP (1,247) The Saskatchewan Immigration nominee program is not established pursuant to specific legislative authority. It derives its authority pursuant to "management direction from the broader umbrella legislative mandate of the ministry. In this respect, the processes, forms guidelines, criteria, requirements, evaluation and decision making were all created and are governed by broad based ministerial policy. As succinctly put by the ministry, the program has no statutory basis and the officials who administer it do not exercise statutory authority of any kind". XXIV Sec. 10.2.1 applies only to those Provinces that concluded an agreement under sec. 8 of IRPA, not under sec. 9. This means that currently only Quebec is not subject to this federal power. XXV As Zapata-Barrero and Barker 2014: 29 point out: «Given that admissions, reception and citizenship policies have significant downstream impacts on the demographic, linguistic, and cultural make-up of the multinational state, it is unsurprising that sub-state units assert an interest not just in implementing but also in deciding on immigration policy with the goal of mediating the impact of immigration and integration on their own national identity and society». On the relation between sub-state nationalism and immigration, see also Medda-Windisher and Popelier 2014.
